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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
"A PROMISE TO ANSWER FOR THE DEBT, DEFAULT
OR MISCARRIAGE OF ANOTHER"-WHEN CON-
SIDERATION IS BENEFICIAL TO PROMISOR.
In Leonard v. Vredenburgh' Chief Justice Kent divided the
cases falling within the section of the Statute of Frauds deal-
ing with promises to answer for the debt, default or miscar-
riage of another into three classes:
"1. Cases in which the promise is collateral to the principal
contract, but is made at the same tim. and becomes an essen-
tial ground of the original credit.
"2. Cases in which the collateral undertaking is subsequent
to the creation of the debt, and was not the inducement to it,
though the subsisting liability is the ground of the promise.
"3. A third class of cases in which the promise to pay the
debt of another arises out of some new and original consider-
ation of benefit or harm moving between the newly contracting
parties.
"The first two classes are within the statute, but the last is
not." This article will deal only with the third class of cases
mentioned above.
Chief Justice Kent's statement is undoubtedly too broad.
Construing this statement literally the Statute of Frauds
would be entirely defeated, since any new consideration would
take the case without the statute. Obviously this was not
Judge Kent's intention. A consideration is necessary for
every simple contract, and it is just as essential to a con-
tract within the statute as to one to which the statute is not
applicable. The purpose of the statute is to render contracts
unenforceable, if not in writing, which would otherwise have
been valid and enforceable. Kent's broad statement has been
1. 8 Johnson 29.
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restricted and the true rule laid down by Chief Justice Shaw
in Nelson v. Boynton3, as follows: "Cases are not considered
as coming within the Statute of Frauds when the party
promising has for his primary object a benefit which he did
not before enjoy accruing immediately to himself; but where
the object of the promise is to obtain the release of the person
or property of the debtor, or other forbearance or benefit to
him it is within the statute." This section of the Statute of
Frauds when passed in 1672, was intended to prevent the per-
petration of fraud upon the promisor, but when the main ob-
ject of the promise is to secure a direct benefit to the promisor,
the element of fraud disappears and the statute is unneces-
sary.
It would seem obvious that if the actuating motive of the
promise is to obtain for the promisor some direct benefit,
such as the relinquishment of a lien on property of which he
is the owner or the completion of work in which he is muter-
ested, then such promise is an original one, and the mere fact
that incidentally it guarantees another's debt will not bring it
within the operation of the Statute of Frauds. But if his
promise, although induced by a pecuniary consideration mov-
ing directly to him, is made mainly for the benefit of the
debtor, to guarantee his debt, it is within the statute and must
be in writing. Such is the case with contracts made with
surety companies.
This rule has been consistently followed in England and in
the majority of the United States. This article can only at-
tempt to show its application in a few important jurisdictions.
In our own State ever since Walther v. Merrill3 , there
has been no break in the chain of decisions on this subject,
and the rule is well established. Kansas City Sewer Pipe Co.
v. Smith ;4 Martin v. Harrington.6 In Moore v. McHaney, 6 A
held a chattel mortgage on mules belonging to B, who was
2. 3 Metcalf 396.
3. 6 Mo. App. 370 (1878).
4, 36 Mo. App. 608, 1. C. 626. 626.
5. 174 Mo. ApP. 707. 1. c. 709, 710 (1913).
6. 191 Mo. App. 686 (1915).
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using them to do work for C. B defaulted and C, who was
desirous of having the work completed, in consideration of
A's refraining to foreclose, promised to pay the mortgage.
The court unanimously held that since the primary object of
C's promise was to directly benefit himself, it made no differ-
ence that B's debt remained, and C's promise was not within
the Statute of Frauds, although incidentally it was a promise
to pay another's debt.
The same consistency of opinion appears in the New York
decisions following Leonard v. Vredenburgh, supra, but, as
in Massachusetts, the rule is somewhat restricted. Farley v.
Cleveland;' Mallory v. Gillett;3 Schultz v. Cohen ; Mannetti
v. Doege.'0 In Sinkovitz v. Applebaum," plaintiff, a sub-
contractor, refused to complete the work on defendant's house
because of the contractor's failure to pay; whereupon de-
fendant, in consideration of plaintiff's completing the work,
promised to pay him. Held, not within the Statute of Frauds
because defendant's promise was based on a new and inde-
pendent consideration consisting of a direct benefit to him,
which was the sole motive for his promise.
The Massachusetts cases follow Nelson v. Boynton, supra.
Ames v. Foster; 2 Manning v. Anthony." In the last case
A held a mortgage on a certain piece of land placed thereon
by B, defendant's grantor. Defendant, also owner of the
equity of redemption, promised that if A would forbear fore-
closing the mortgage against the land he (Defendant) would
pay the mortgage note. Held, defendant's promise was not
within the Statute of Frauds since it was made for his own
benefit, irrespective of the fact that B's debt was thereby
incidentally guaranteed.
Clifford v. Luhring, 1 lays down the same rule for Illinois.
7. 4 Cowen 432 (1825).
8. 21 N. Y. 412. L c. 418-420.
9. 13 Miac. 638.
10. 48 App. Div. 567 (1900).
11. 66 Misc. 527 (1907).
12. 106 Mass. 400, 1. c. 403.
13. 208 Mas. 399.
14. 69 111. 401 (1873).
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Also in accord are Murto v. McKnight;' 6 Blasdell v.
Erickson."
The Supreme Court of the United States in Emerson v.
Slater," approved the rule as stated above. In this case
plaintiff was a contractor under contract to build a railroad
for C, a corporation, of which defendant was a creditor. The
payment of C's debt to the defendant depended upon the suc-
cess of the road when completed and in operation. Plaintiff,
failing to receive his monthly salary, refused to continue the
work. Defendant then orally promised to pay plaintiff if he
would complete the work. Held, that this promise was not
within the scope of the Statute of Frauds because the consid-
eration for it was a direct benefit to the promisor (Defend-
ant). In accord with this case are Davis v. Patrick'; Mine
and Smelter Supply Co. v. StockGrowers' Bank. 11
In the jurisdiction where the Statute of Frauds originated
the decisions clearly show that the judges are convinced that
such a promise is not within the mischief provided against by
the statute, Castling v. Aubert ;o Fitzgerald v. Dressier.2'
The textbook authorities on this subject are numerous, in-
cluding Wood on the Statute of Fraud,22 and Parsons on
Contracts.23
L= M. ALI N.
HARoLD S. CooK.
15. 2a 11L App. 238, L r. 246
16. 157 IU. App. 615. L e. 618
17. 22 Howard 28 (159).
18. 141 U. S. 479.
19. 173 Fed. 859, L c. 863.
20. 2 East 32 , 1. c. 33L
21. 7 C. B. (N. 8.) 214, . . 392.
22. PaMl 224-225.
23. pae 24-I2 (Eighth ZdUon).
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